There are two contributions in this article. First, we give a direct proof of the known fact that Frege systems with substitution can be p-simulated by the calculus of structures (CoS) extended with the substitution rule. This is done without referring to the p-equivalence of extended Frege systems and Frege systems with substitution. Second, we then show that the cut-free CoS with substitution is p-equivalent to the cut-free CoS with extension.
INTRODUCTION
Extension and substitution are concepts studied in proof complexity of propositional classical logic. The basic idea behind both concepts is that complex formulas can be abbreviated by propositional variables to shorten a proof. So far, extension and substitution have mostly been investigated together with Frege systems, which for a long time have been the main tool for studying proof complexity. Cook and Reckhow [1979] showed that Frege systems with substitution can p-simulate Frege systems with extension. Several years later, Dowd [1985] and Krajíček and Pudlák [1989] showed that Frege systems with extension can also p-simulate Frege systems with substitution. It is still an open problem whether Frege systems without extension/substitution can p-simulate Frege systems with extension/substitution.
Recently, Bruscoli and Guglielmi [2009] showed that deep inference proof systems, such as the calculus of structures (CoS) [Guglielmi 2007; Brünnler and Tiu 2001; Guglielmi and Straßburger 2001] , can provide a natural framework for studying extension and substitution. As shown Bruscoli and Guglielmi [2009] , Frege systems and CoS (with cut) p-simulate each other and are therefore equally powerful with respect to proof complexity. However, unlike Frege systems, the CoS is a proof formalism that comes with methods for proof search [KahramanogullarІ 2006; Chaudhuri et al. 2011; Chaudhuri 2013b ] and proof normalization [Brünnler 2003a [Brünnler , 2006 This work has been supported by the French National Research Agency (ANR) project STRUCTURAL and the Ministry of Education and Science of Serbia project ON 174026. Authors' current addresses: N. Novaković, Microsoft Development Center, Spanskih boraca 3/3, 11070 Belgrade, Serbia; L. Straßburger, INRIA Saclay -Île-de-France, 1 rue Honoré d'Estienne d'Orves, Bâtiment Alan Turing, Campus de l'École Polytechnique, 91120 Palaiseau, France. Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, to redistribute to lists, or to use any component of this work in other works requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Permissions may be requested from Publications Dept., ACM, Inc., 2 Penn Plaza, Suite 701, New York, NY 10121-0701 USA, fax +1 (212) 869-0481, or permissions@acm.org. (1) has been shown in Cook and Reckhow [1979] , (2) in Krajíček and Pudlák [1989] and Dowd [1985] , (3) and (6) in Bruscoli and Guglielmi [2009] , (4) and (7) in Straßburger [2012] , and (5) in Bruscoli and Guglielmi [2009] and Straßburger [2012] . . This means that we can now study cut-free proof systems with extension and substitution [Straßburger 2012 ]. Some research in that direction has already been done by Arai [1996] .
The purpose of this article is to fill two gaps that have been left open in the previous work [Bruscoli and Guglielmi 2009; Straßburger 2012] investigating the concepts of extension and substitution within the CoS:
(1) There is a straightforward translation between proofs in Frege systems and proofs in the CoS [Bruscoli and Guglielmi 2009] , leading only to a polynomial increase in the size of proofs in both directions, and thus establishing the p-equivalence of Frege systems and CoS. This translation carries over to the case where extension is present. But when substitution is present, the naive translation of Frege proofs into CoS proofs breaks down. This might cause the belief that substitution in the CoS is a priori a weaker concept than substitution in Frege systems [Guglielmi 2010 ]. However, in this article we show that this is not justified. We show that with a subtle modification, the naive translation carries over to the case with substitution. This properly establishes the correspondence between Frege systems with substitution and CoS with substitution. As a consequence, the construction used in Straßburger [2012] for showing that CoS with extension p-simulates CoS with substitution can now be seen as alternative proof of the result by Krajíček and Pudlák [1989] . (2) In Straßburger [2012] , it has been shown that also in the cut-free case CoS with extension, p-simulates CoS with substitution, but it was left open whether the converse also holds. In this article, we show that cut-free CoS with substitution p-simulates cut-free CoS with extension. This establishes the p-equivalence of extension and substitution also in the cut-free case.
The whole picture is summarized in Figure 1 , where an arrow from one system to the other means that the first system p-simulates the second. The label indicates the place where this has been proven first. The dotted arrows refer to open problems and the double arrows to the results of this work, which is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present preliminaries on Frege systems and CoS. Section 4 and Section 5 correspond to the preceding points (1) and (2), respectively. Final remarks are provided in Section 6. 
PRELIMINARIES ON FREGE SYSTEMS
Proof systems. We adopt a general view of proof systems as presented in Cook and Reckhow [1979] . A proof system is defined as a surjective PTIME function S : * → T from a set of finite words * over a signature to the set T of all propositional tautologies. The assignment S : → S( ) assigns to an element of * , called a proof , its conclusion. A size of a proof is a function |−| : * → N, assigning to a proof the number | | of symbols in . For proof systems S 1 : * 1 → T and S 2 : * 2 → T , we say that S 2 p-simulates S 1 if there is a polynomial p such that for every proof 1 ∈ * 1 there is a proof 2 ∈ * 2 such that S 1 ( 1 ) = S 2 ( 2 ) and | 2 | ≤ p(| 1 |)-that is, proofs of * 1 can be assigned proofs * 2 of same conclusions whose size is dominated by a fixed polynomial in the size of * 1 proofs. Systems which p-simulate each other are said to be p-equivalent.
Frege systems. A (general) Frege system is defined by a set Ax of formulas called axioms and a set R of (general) inference rule schemata, where a schema r ∈ R is of the form
where B 1 , . . . , B n , B are formula variables-that is, metavariables, denotations of arbitrary formulas. A derivation of a formula A in a Frege system from a given set of axioms and a collection of inference rules is a sequence of formulas A 1 , . . . , A m such that A m = A, and every A k is either an axiom or it is derived from some of the formulas A i , i < k, as an instance of a rule from R. These systems are named after Gottlob Frege in Cook and Reckhow [1979] , but they also appear in literature as Hilbert-Frege, Hilbert, or Hilbert-Ackermann systems. For the case of classical propositional logic, there are numerous possible axiomatizations of Frege systems, and an example system consists of the following axioms (usually expressed in the implication/negation language):
where A, B, and C are formula variables, and a single inference rule modus ponens, MP:
Besides the essential properties of soundness and completeness of the Frege system for classical propositional logic, it has been shown in Cook and Reckhow [1979] that all Frege systems for this logic p-simulate each other. That allows us to think of the system F defined by the set of axioms (2.1) as "the" Frege system, since all of the proof complexity results that we may have on a specific system translate to the entire formalism. In addition, note Theorem 2.1.
THEOREM 2.1 [COOK AND RECKHOW 1979] . Every Frege system is p-equivalent to sequent calculus for classical propositional logic with cut.
Extension. The notion of extension in Frege systems, due to Tseitin [1968] , comes from the idea of using abbreviations in a proof. The concept can be formalized as follows. An extended Frege system is a Frege system whose set of axioms Ax is augmented by the extension axioms of the form
where a i are fresh propositional variables that abbreviate formulas A i , subject to the condition that a variable a i neither occurs in the conclusion of the proof nor in any of the A 1 , . . . , A j , for j ≤ i. We call the a i extension variables and the A i extension formulas. We write eF for an extended Frege system.
Substitution. The notion of substitution comes from a slightly different principle than extension, a widely used technique of replacing propositional variables by formulas. Formally, a substitution is a map σ : At → Form from the set of atoms to the set of formulas such that σ (a) = a holds on all but finitely many atoms in At. The reader should notice that there is no constraint put on the nature of the map σ , as it is the case with extension. To have substitution in a Frege system amounts to adding an inference rule, called the substitution rule
to the system, where σ A denotes the result of applying the substitution σ to the formula A-that is, replacing every atom a by σ (a) and every negated atomā by σ (a). We refer to F augmented by the substitution rule as sF. AND PUDLÁK 1989; DOWD 1985] . eF p-simulates sF.
PRELIMINARIES ON CALCULUS OF STRUCTURES
Inference rules. The principle of deep inference, as used in the CoS [Brünnler and Tiu 2001; Guglielmi 2007; Guglielmi and Straßburger 2001] , means that one is allowed to apply inference rules arbitrarily deep inside a formula, to the contrast with sequent calculus or natural deduction [Gentzen 1934 ] where rules are always applied on the outermost connectives. In this article, we follow the formulations as given in Straßburger [2012] . We use the following rule schemata: On the set Form of formulas, we define the relation = to be the smallest congruence generated by
Then, we add another inference rule
with the side condition that A = B.
Derivations. A derivation in the CoS is a rewriting sequence using the inference rules of a given system. There can be at most one instance of an inference rule with empty premise in a derivation. If there is no such instance, then we use the notation
to say that the derivation has premise A, conclusion B, and uses only inference rules in the system S. If a derivation contains a rule with an empty formula in its premise, then this must be the topmost rule, and we use the notation for a derivation in the system S with no premise and with conclusion B. In this case, we also say that is a proof of B. The length of a derivation (or proof) is the number of lines in . The width of is the largest number of literals in a formula occurring in .
System KS. The deep inference proof system defined as earlier by the set of rules (3.1) and (3.3) is called KS. Strictly speaking, the original presentation of the system with the same name in Brünnler and Tiu [2001] differs from ours; it relies on the presence of units for disjunction and conjunction in syntax, f and t, respectively. It is argued in Straßburger [2012] how our presentation is only a mild variation to the presentation of KS in Brünnler and Tiu [2001] , and that the two versions of KS p-simulate each other. Later, we will make use of the following properties of KS. Cut and system SKS. The (atomic) cut rule in deep inference systems is dual to the (atomic) identity
We refer to the system KS ∪{ai↑} as SKS. Again, this definition of the system SKS is a mild modification of the original definition of SKS found in Brünnler and Tiu [2001] . The same paper shows that adding atomic cut yields the nonatomic version of cut, co-contraction, and co-weakening, rules dual to the contraction and weakening, respectively.
PROPOSITION 3.4 [BRÜNNLER AND TIU 2001]. The following rules are derivable in
Moreover, SKS p-simulates SKS ∪ {i↑, c↑, w↑}. Note that this follows from Theorem 2.1 and the p-equivalence of SKS and sequent calculus. However, Bruscoli and Guglielmi [2009] give a direct construction. To show how SKS can be p-simulated in F, it suffices to first exhibit an F proof of A ⇒ B for every SKS rule r
F{A} F{B}
. Then it can be shown by induction on the size of the context F{ } that there is an F derivation of (A ⇒ B) ⇒ (F{A} ⇒ F{B}) whose size is polynomial in |F{A} ⇒ F{B}|. Thus, an entire SKS proof can be simulated by consecutive applications of MP, whose number is linear in the size of the SKS proof. The other direction (i.e., the p-simulation of F in SKS) will be discussed in detail in Section 4.
Extension. There are two ways of adding extension to the CoS. First, on can do the same as in Frege systems and simply add additional axioms. This has been done in Bruscoli and Guglielmi [2009] in the following way. A proof in xSKS of conclusion B is an SKS derivation whose conclusion is B and whose premise is the conjunction of the extension axioms (2.2). Then, the proof of Theorem 3.6 can be used to prove the following. The second way of adding extension to SKS, proposed in Straßburger [2012] , is to add for every extension axiom a i ⇔ A i the two rules
This allows us to use extension in the absence of cut (or modus ponens). We write eKS for KS ∪ {ext↓} and eSKS for SKS ∪ {ext↓}.
THEOREM 3.8 [STRAßBURGER 2012]. xSKS and eSKS are p-equivalent.
Substitution. Substitution is added to the CoS in exactly the same way as it is added to Frege systems: by adding the inference rule
for a given a substitution σ : At → Form. However, note that this rule cannot be applied deeply, even if it is added to a deep inference system. The rule in (3.6) is only sound when applied to the whole formula and not just to a selected subformula. We define sKS to be KS ∪ {sub↓} and sSKS to be SKS ∪ {sub↓}. Together with Theorem 3.8 (which is also shown via rather simple direct translations), these two results show that in the CoS extension and substitution are pequivalent, and their proofs show that this fact is almost a triviality. Furthermore, we have the following (again, with a rather simple proof). On the one hand, this shows (together with Theorems 2.2, 2.3, and 3.7) that extension and substitution are p-equivalent in Frege systems and in the CoS. COROLLARY 3.12. sF, eF, sSKS, xSKS, and eSKS are all p-equivalent.
On the other hand, this fact relies (so far) on Theorem 2.3, whose proof is much more involved than the others, because (so far) there is no simple simulation of sF in any of sSKS, xSKS, or eSKS. In the following section, we show that sSKS p-simulates sF by giving a direct construction that follows the scheme of the p-simulation of F in SKS (Theorem 3.6).
SUBSTITUTION IN FREGE AND COS
In this section, we show that CoS with substitution p-simulates Frege systems with substitution. Let us start by recalling the simple construction by Bruscoli and Guglielmi [2009] for translating a (substitution-free) F-proof into an SKS-proof, with a polynomial blow-up. This is a rather standard construction (e.g., see Krajíček [1996] ), and it is done in three steps. First, we observe that every axiom A in the Frege system has an SKSproof A of size O(|A| 2 ). Second, from a given F-proof A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n , we proceed by induction on n to produce an SKS-proof of the conjunction A 1 ∧ A 2 ∧ · · · ∧ A n . This is done as follows. Assume by induction hypothesis an SKS-proof of the conjunction A 1 ∧ A 2 ∧ · · · ∧ A n−1 . If A n is an axiom, we immediately obtain by combining and the proof A n of A n . If A n is obtained by applying modus ponens to some A i and A j , where A j is A i ⇒ A n and 0 < i, j < n, then we obtain from as follows:
In the third step, the proof of A 1 ∧ A 2 ∧ · · · ∧ A n is transformed into a proof of A n by an application of the rule w↑.
It has been shown in Bruscoli and Guglielmi [2009] (for xSKS) and Straßburger [2012] (for eSKS) how this argument easily carries over when extension is present. However, as observed by Bruscoli [Guglielmi 2010 ], the same cannot be used when substitution is present: If in the preceding argument the formula A n is obtained by applying the substitution rule to some A i with 0 < i < n (i.e., A n = σ A i for some substitution σ ), then in the sF-proof, the formula A i is still available for later use. However, in sSKS, the substitution rule cannot be applied deeply. Thus, the whole conjunction
is subject to the substitution, and a simple use of the c↑-rule is not enough to keep A i for later reuse. Furthermore, all formulas in the chain are destroyed.
To make the argument work again, we have to find a way to apply the substitution such that both A i and σ A i are subformulas of the resulting formula. To see how this can be achieved, consider first the substitution σ , which is obtained from σ as follows:
When we apply σ to A i , we get a "merge" of A i and A n = σ A i , and we would like to get two derivations by using a series of w↑-applications. Depending on whether we chose to delete the new B-occurrences or the superfluous a-occurrences, we can get
Of course, this does not work because σ sendsā toā ∨B, and there is no way of getting backā norB by a w↑ or any other sound inference rule. To overcome this problem, we now construct a slightly more complicated substitution σ * , for which we can obtain something similar to (4.2). For every substitution σ used in the sF-proof, we pick a fresh propositional variable x σ , and we assign to σ the substitution σ * as follows:
This has the following crucial property. 
PROOF. First note that
The heart of our proof consists of the following four derivations: and Note how the structure of the formula after substitution allows us in (4.6) to overcome the problem of the naive approach using σ mentioned earlier. The derivations in (4.4) are now obtained by plugging the derivations in (4.5) and (4.6) into each place in A where a variable is affected by σ . The additional occurrence of x σ (resp.x σ ) is provided by the following derivation, which exists for every formula D and context C{ }:
where x is either x σ orx σ , and where s consists only of instances of s, and its length is linear in the depth of D in C{ }. In our case, this is O(|A|). The existence of s can be shown by a straightforward induction on the structure of C{ } (e.g., see Straßburger [2003] and Brünnler [2003b] ). Furthermore, since the number of variables affected by σ in A is smaller than |A|, we have that the length of the overall derivations is O(|A| 2 ). Finally, the width of the overall derivation is smaller than or equal to |σ *
A| + 2. 2
We can now use this lemma to perform the inductive step that has been done for the rule of modus ponens in (4.1) for the substitution rule as well. We obtain from as follows (where A n is obtained from A i by applying σ ):
where in the first instance of sub↓ we use σ * as substitution, as defined in (4.3), and in the second instance of sub↓ we use {x σ → σ A i } as substitution, observing that x σ occurs nowhere else.
We now have a direct proof of the following.
THEOREM 4.2. sSKS p-simulates sF.
PROOF. Given an sF-proof A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n , where each A k is either an axiom, or obtained via the substitution rule from some A i with 1 i < k, or obtained via modus ponens from some A i and A j , where A j is A i ⇒ A k with 1 i, j < k. We construct an sSKS-proof of A n of the following shape:
, where is obtained by induction on n, following the preceding construction. The overall size of the constructed sSKS derivation can be assessed as follows. Let m be the size of the sF-proof. The total length of the sSKS derivation (using general rules) is bounded by a quadratic function in m, whereas width is O(m 2 ), due to the substitution. This gives the combined estimate of size of O(m 4 ). Abandoning general rules-that is, replacing i↑, i↓, c↑, and c↓ by their atomic versions ai↑, ai↓, ac↑, and ac↓, respectively-increases the estimate for the size to O(m 8 ). Removing all instances of ac↑ (i.e., replacing them by derivations consisting of ai↓, ai↑, ac↓, s) does not increase that estimate. 2
In Lemma 4.1 and its corollary Theorem 4.2, the goal is to derive B = σ A by a substitution from A while keeping A. The main idea there is the essential use of substitution
that encompasses the following reasoning: if B is true, map a to a-that is, do nothing, keep A. If B is false, map a to whatever it is turned to by σ to get B. The rest of the trick is suitable use of co-weakenings, as in (4.5) and (4.6), which is something that we have tried to do with σ but fails for negative polarities. This time, the substitution works for negative polarities, since it maps a → (B ∧ā) ∨ (B ∧ σ a), for a positive, and the result entails (B ⇒ā) ∧ (B ⇒ σ a), as can be seen by a single instance of the medial rule:
This gives an alternative way of obtaining the the two derivations in (4.6) by using an instance of medial (and commutativity of ∧ and ∨):
followed by derivations of the same shape as the ones in (4.5). Note how the described construction can be carried out in one substitution step instead of two by using {a
We present it in two separate steps for the sake of simpler exposition. 
EXTENSION AND SUBSTITUTION IN CUT-FREE SYSTEMS
The work in Straßburger [2012] has shown how extension and substitution can be used in cut-free systems. Furthermore, Theorem 3.10 immediately lifts to the cut-free case.
THEOREM 5.1 [STRAßBURGER 2012]. eKS p-simulates sKS.
However, the other direction remained open in Straßburger [2012] , because xSKS was used to show that sSKS p-simulates eSKS, and thus the cut played a crucial role.
In this section, we give a direct proof showing that sKS also p-simulates eKS. The actual difficulty is that if we naively replace an instance of ext↓ by an instance of sub↓,
with σ = {a → A}, all occurrences of a in F{ } are replaced by A. This can lead to an exponential blow-up, due to the presence of contraction, as shown in the following example.
Example 5.2. Let a 1 ⇔ a 2 ∨ a 2 , a 2 ⇔ a 3 ∨ a 3 , . . . , a n ⇔ A be the extension axioms in the eKS derivation depicted in the left part of Figure 2 , whose size is linear in n. The naive attempt to simply replace all instances of extension by substitutions results in an exponential increase in size, as depicted in the right of that figure.
To overcome the problem of the exponential blow-up exhibited in Figure 2 , we transform the whole derivation in a first step into a derivation with the property that whenever we encounter an instance of extension (3.5) with extension variable a, there is at most one other occurrence of a in the formula (namely asā) so that the replacement (5.1)-done in the second step-causes only a limited increase of the size of the proof.
The first transformation is achieved by a rather aggressive renaming of extension variable occurrences in the derivation. Informally, this can be described using the notion of atomic flows [Guglielmi and Gundersen 2008; , which are similar to logical flow graphs [Buss 1991 ], but which only trace occurrences of literals in the derivation: the vertices of the graph are the instances of the inference rules-except s and m, which are ignored by atomic flows. Then, the first transformation of our p-simulation consists of two substeps. First we integrate all contraction nodes on extension variables into the corresponding extension rule node (done in the following Lemma 5.3). This does not change the size of the atomic flow (when size is counted as number of paths) but can cause a quadratic increase in the size of the derivation. Then we do the actual renaming that does not change the structure of the atomic flow. But after this renaming, every extension variable labels exactly two edges in the graph: one positively and one in negated form. This is done later in Lemma 5.6.
We do not go into further details on atomic flows here for the following reasons. First, they are not needed for the formal construction. Second, they are only developed for the extension-free case, and developing the theory of atomic flows for systems with extension would go beyond the scope of this. Third, atomic flows do not help at all in understanding the second transformation of our simulation (done later in Lemma 5.8), which essentially performs steps of the form (5.1) and reintroduces contractions that have been deleted previously. This has to be done in the right order to avoid the exponential blow-up shown in Figure 2 .
To make the first transformation mentioned earlier formally correct, we need to generalize the extension rule. In particular, we need to allow extension variables to abbreviate more than one extension formula. We clearly have to take some precautions to avoid inconsistency.
Let E be a set of propositional variables. A variable preorder is a a transitive and reflexive relation on E. We write a ∼ b if and only if a b and b a. We call a substitution σ banal if for all variables a / ∈ E we have σ a = a, and for all a ∈ E we have σ a = b for some b ∼ a. Note that ∼ is an equivalence relation that we can extend to all formulas as follows: we say B ∼ C if and only if there is a banal σ such that σ B = σ C. Now we define a set of generalized extension axioms to be a finite set of statements
where the set {a 1 , . . . , a k } is equipped with a variable preorder such that the following conditions are fulfilled:
(1) For all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the variable a i must not occur in the conclusion of a proof nor in any A j with a j a i , and (2) for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, if a i ∼ a j , then A i ∼ A j .
As before, we call the a i extension variables and the A i extension formulas.
Notice how the standard definition of the set of extension axioms, which we now call strict, is a special case where every equivalence class in ∼ is singleton. Additionally, notice how the generalized definition allows simultaneous presence of a ∼ ⇔ B and a ∼ ⇔ C, as long as B and C are in a same equivalence class under ∼.
We can now define a generalization of the extension rule given in (3.5): We define esKS to be the system obtained from sKS by adding the ext ↓ rule and allowing a set of generalized extension axioms. We call a derivation in esKS -naive if all instances of ext↓ in are naive, the set of extension axioms is strict, and there is no instance of sub↓ in , and -clever if
(1) every instance of ext↓ in is clever, (2) there is no instance of sub↓ in , and (3) every extension variable occurs at most twice in each line of , once in positive form, and at most once in negated form, and if this is the case, the positive/ negative pair can be traced up in to an instance of ai↓.
Clearly, every eKS proof is at the same time also a naive esKS proof, because ext↓ is just a special case of naive ext ↓. Furthermore, every naive esKS proof can trivially be transformed into an eKS proof by replacing all ext↓ instances by a derivation of ac↓ and ext↓.
LEMMA 5.3. Let be a naive esKS proof with conclusion B. Then there is a naive esKS proof with conclusion B such that the rule ac↓ is never applied to an extension variable, and such that the size of is O(| | 2 ). Furthermore, has the same extension axioms as .
PROOF. To obtain , we iteratively permute the lowest ac↓ on an extension variable (or a negated extension variable) down in the derivation until it vanishes. This is done as follows (see also Brünnler [2003b] ). Consider the rule instance r immediately below such a contraction, where r is some rule in esKS. There are two cases. If r is ext↓ applied on the freshly obtained literal in the conclusion of the contraction, then our instance of ac↓ can be removed as follows:
In all other cases, we can trivially permute r and ac↓:
Since the conclusion of the proof does not contain any extension variables, all ac↓ on extension variables must eventually disappear. Now notice that the size increasing step is permuting the contraction with non-ext↓ rules. One contraction on its way down can increase the size of the proof by at most the height h of the derivation. Thus, if c is the number of contractions in , then we have h, c ≤ | |, and the size of is dominated by
Example 5.4. Figure 3 shows an example of our construction. The first derivation in that figure is a proof in eKS, and the second one is the result of applying Lemma 5.3 to it. Remark 5.5. Note that the proof of Lemma 5.3 relies on the fact that we are cut-free. It would not work for esKS (which is sSKS extended with ext↓) because in the presence of co-contraction
permuting down ac↓ leads to an exponential blow-up of the size of the proof.
The next lemma says that every naive eKS proof with no contractions on extension variables can be transformed into a clever one of the same size. This time, however, the assigned set of extension axioms has to be transformed into a set of generalized ones. PROOF. In the given proof , we proceed from top to bottom, and whenever an extension variable occurrence a is introduced-this can happen in the conclusion of ai↓, or w↓, or ext↓-we replace it by a fresh variable a . To keep the proof a valid esKS proof, we have to do two things:
(1) We have to trace this occurrence of a down in the proof and replace it everywhere by a . Eventually, this must reach the premise of an ext↓ instance because a cannot occur in the conclusion of the proof. Since there is no contraction duplicating a, every rule instance remains valid, except for the ext↓ instance in whose premise a now occurs. (2) To make this ext↓ instance Then we perform the preceding steps 1 and 2 for the new occurrence ofā and the new occurrence of a . -If we encounter a w↓ instance with premise F{B} and a conclusion F{B ∨ C}, we perform the preceding steps 1 and 2 for each occurrence of an extension variable in C. In particular, if the same extension variable a appears more than once in C, then each occurrence is replaced by a new fresh variable. -If we encounter an instance of ext↓, then all extension variables in the premise of ext↓ must already have been renamed (since we proceed from top to bottom in the proof) and belong to the same equivalence class of ∼. So, assume that it is
As in the case for w↓, we have to perform the preceding steps 1 and 2 for each occurrence of an extension variable in C. As a consequence, the C in the conclusion is replaced by some formula C , whose extension variables are all fresh and mutually distinct. But this makes the instance (5.4) of ext↓ invalid. To make it valid again, we have to add for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k} the extension axiom b i
. Again, this preserves the two conditions for sets of generalized extension axioms.
Then, the resulting proof is clever, and clearly, no renaming changes the size of the proof so that | | = | |. The total number of new extension axioms is bounded by 2 · n ai↓ + s w↓ + s ext↓ , where n ai↓ is the total number of ai↓ rules in , and s w↓ and s ext↓ are the total size of the formulas introduced in conclusions of w↓ and ext↓, respectively. Clearly, the sum is O(| |).
Example 5.7. To continue Example 5.4, the third derivation in Figure 3 shows the result of applying Lemma 5.6. PROOF. This transformation is done in two steps. In the first one, we proceed from top to bottom and replace every instance of ext↓ in to obtain an intermediary esKS proof * as follows:
where the used substitution is {b 1 → A, . . . , b k → A}, and F { } is obtained from F{ } by applying this substitution. Since is clever, each b i occurs at most once (in the form ofb i ) in F{ } and the path of thisb i ends in another ext↓, which has as conclusion a formula from whichĀ can be obtained by renaming extension variables occurring in A.
In particular, we have B i ∼ B j and B i ∼ A for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Thus, the instance of ext↓ remains valid. Furthermore, in * , all instances of ext↓ are such that k = 0 and A does not contain two different occurrences of a same extension variable.
The transformation from to * can increase the size of the proof. The length of * is bound by 2 · l, where l is the length of , and the width of * is bound by w · e · f, where w is the width of , e is the maximal number of extension variables in a single formula in , and f is the maximal size of an extension formula appearing in . Since we have e, f w, that entails | * | is O(| | 3 ). In the second step of our transformation, we remove all resulting ext↓ instances in * as follows, again proceeding from top to bottom:
where the used substitution σ in the sub↓ is a renaming of extension variables that must exist by definition of ext↓. Since σ changes the context F{ } into F { }, it has an effect on the instances of ext↓ in the following derivation:
It remains to show that each of them remains a valid instance-the validity of the other rules is clearly not affected by the substitution. Now, note that σ is banal-that is, just a renaming of extension variables occurring in some extension formulas. In particular, the image of such an extension formula under σ is another extension formula in the same equivalence class of ∼. Thus, every C i can still be substituted to D. Furthermore, if C i , C j share an extension variable, they must be the same, as every extension formula is fresh when introduced in . This means that there is a substitution that can rewrite all C i into D. Thus, the instance of ext↓ in the right of (5.7) remains valid if the one on the left is valid. This guarantees that we can perform (5.6) for all instances of ext↓ in * , and the resulting proof is well defined. The transformation * → yields an increase in size that is the consequence of the increase in length alone, as all of the substitutions in (5.6) do not increase size. They are simply renamings of extension variables. The increase in length (using general contraction) is bounded by e · w, where e stands for the number of ext ↓ rules in * and w for width of * . With e, w ≤ | * |, one gets that the size of the derivation with ext↓
. Finally, we can apply Proposition 3.2 to get a derivation in sKS. It is well known that this yields another quadratic increase in size of the derivation [Brünnler and Tiu 2001] , thus the overall size of is O(| * | 4 ), and combined with the previous step,
Example 5.9. The fourth derivation in Figure 3 shows the result of exhaustively applying the reduction in (5.5) to the third derivation in that figure. Finally, the last derivation in that figure shows the result of the exhaustive application of (5.6). The full sequence of derivations in Figure 3 depicts the construction of an sKS proof from an eKS one. THEOREM 5.10. sKS p-simulates eKS.
PROOF. As observed earlier, a given eKS proof is a naive esKS proof. Now, we apply Lemmas 5.3, 5.6, and 5.8, giving us a sKS proof with the same conclusion as and with size of O(| | 24 ). 2
The main idea of the construction in this section is rather simple: diversify extension variables as much as possible-that is, whenever two extension variables do not "communicate" via structural rules, which is to say that they do not belong to a same connected component in the assigned proof net or atomic flow (graph) [Guglielmi and Gundersen 2008; , they should be named differently. We show that such a construction is possible, and we give sharp bounds on complexity. However, there is a simpler way to convince oneself that the construction is polynomial, as there is an important invariant in the construction: if is an eKS proof of A, every formula in every step of the transformation of to an sKS proof contains at most | | 2 occurrences of a same extension variable. At the same time, the total number of the extension variables introduced in the construction is polynomial (quadratic) in the size of .
FINAL REMARKS
In this article, we show a direct polynomial simulation of Frege systems with substitution in CoS with substitution, and we show that analytic CoS systems eKS and sKS with extension and substitution are p-equivalent. The CoS is the focus of this work, as it is a first-class citizen for systems with both normalization and proof search. In fact, it is used as the basis of the Profound prover [Chaudhuri 2013a ], which is an interactive theorem prover using subformula linking as an interaction method [Chaudhuri 2013b ].
Moreover, in analytic systems, extension is naturally deep, reflecting the original Tseitin's transformation, making CoS the adequate framework for our discussion. Still, we note that both techniques demonstrated in our two proofs can be, mutatis mutandis, repeated in context of the prototypical representative of structural proof systemsGentzen's LK, provided one allows extension rule to act deep inside a formula. We believe this fact to be a confirmation that both our results rely on features of structural systems in general.
Our result of direct simulation of sF in sSKS shows how substitution has the same power as extension in the presence of cut using the techniques of structural systems alone. Not only does it give a new proof of the p-equivalence of sF and eF using the simple, elegant steps from structural proof theory, it remedies a somewhat inferior status of structural proof theory, where facts about its complexity rely on results in other formalisms. Furthermore, although the result of polynomial simulation is not new, the fact that there is a polynomial transformation of sF in sSKS does not say anything about the simulation itself. In particular, it is possible that a polynomial transformation involves global transformation steps, as is the case in Section 5. What we have shown is that the destructive effect of substitution in structural systems where it acts on entire sequents and prevents us from having access to the substituted formula can be fixed by devising a clever substitution that can preserve access to the original formula. Furthermore, this is a local transformation of polynomial price.
The construction showing that SKS p-simulates Frege systems is very similar to the one showing that tree-like Frege systems p-simulate (dag-like) Frege systems [Krajíček 1996 ]. To show that SKS and tree-like Frege systems p-simulate each other is as straightforward as showing that SKS and Gentzen systems p-simulate each other [Brünnler and Tiu 2001] . This means that our construction of simulating sF in sSKS can also be used to give a direct proof that tree-like Frege systems with substitution can p-simulate dag-like Frege systems with substitution, which has been shown by other means in Bonet and Galesi [1997] .
One of the most important and very hard open problems in proof complexity is establishing the relation between cut and extension/substitution, usually formulated by asking if Frege systems p-simulate Frege systems with substitution. We already know that in the presence of cut, systems with extension and substitution are pequivalent, and since Straßburger [2012] , we can ask the same question in cut-free systems. This is precisely the result of Section 5, pointing to the conclusion that the substitution versus extension result is orthogonal to the presence of cut and is not simply a consequence of a possible situation that Frege is the most economic proof system we have (i.e., as economical as eF or sF).
Assume for a second the opposite conclusion from what we have shown in Section 5-that is, assume that substitution does not p-simulate extension in an analytic CoS. In that case, cut would act as a p-equalizer for systems with extension and substitution, and it would be capable of bridging the gap between the two in the absence of cut. Such a result would perhaps point to the possibility that Frege p-simulates Frege with substitution. However, the actual result of Section 5 provides no evidence in support of such claim.
In addition to the well-known and hard open problem of Frege versus Frege with extension, there are others. In particular, one can formulate an analytic version of the problem: does KS p-simulate sKS, or is there a class of tautologies witnessing separation? We strongly suspect the latter to be the case, but negative complexity results in deep inference appear to be difficult in general. One exception to that is a known fact [Bruscoli and Guglielmi 2009 ] that Statman tautologies [Statman 1978] have polynomial proofs in KS but no polynomial proof in cut-free LK. Another open problem is whether the separation of the two systems lifts to the case of sKS and LK with substitution.
Finally, a more pressing and maybe more delicate issue is robustness [Cook and Reckhow 1979] , which says that any two Frege systems p-simulate each other, and therefore we are able to speak of the Frege system for classical logic. Robustness is enjoyed by any system where composition of derivations can be done at polynomial price, as is the case with formalisms with cut. In particular, one can establish psimulation results between Frege and CoS as formalisms, relying on their robustness to abstract away from specific proof systems and axiomatizations of rules. However, systems without cut do not come equipped with a predefined notion of robustness, and it is not clear how such a notion should be formulated, because one has to define what it means to have an analytic proof system or even a cut-free system in the broadest sense. For example, it is well known that different cut-free sequent calculi do not p-simulate each other, not to speak of analytic tableaux, resolution, or truth tables, which are all incomparable with respect to p-simulation [D'Agostino 1992; Brünnler 2003b] . However, it has long been known [Guglielmi 2003; Brünnler and Tiu 2001] , and recently been investigated in a systematic way [Das 2012] , that KS can p-simulate truth tables, analytic tableaux, tree-like resolution, and tree-like cut-free sequent calculi. It is conjectured that it also p-simulates dag-like sequent calculi and dag-like resolution.
This makes KS a good candidate for the cut-free system. In particular, the formulation of KS is independent of the presence of the constants t and f for truth and falsum, respectively. This has first been observed in Straßburger [2012] and formally proved in Das [2013] . This proof can easily be extended to the presence of extension/substitution: the only critical case is when the extension formula is a constant-that is, we have extension axioms a i ⇔ t or a i ⇔ f. But in that pathological case, the naïve method of eliminating extension can be applied without the exponential blow-up that happens in the general case.
Another important observation is related to the co-contraction rule c↑ of SKS, which is analytic in the sense that all ingredients of the premise are present in the conclusion, but when added to KS, it allows for quasipolynomial simulation of Frege systems [Jeřábek 2009; Bruscoli et al. 2010] . This gives us, a priori, four inference rules for proof compression by which KS can be augmented: cut, co-contraction, extension, and substitution. The contribution of this article is to show that there is no difference between extension and substitution with respect to p-simulation. As observed by Das, 1 substitution can p-simulate atomic co-contraction ac↑ when co-weakening is present: just use the substitution σ = {a → a ∧ a} (respectively σ = {a → a ∨ a}), and then use a series of contractions and co-weakenings to undo the substitution in the context of the ac↑ instance to be simulated. However, it is not clear whether such a result can be obtained in the absence of co-weakening.
Finally, the relation between cut and substitution remains the most prominent open problem in this area.
